Making transnational markets: the institutional politics behind the TTIP by Bartl, Marija
 Making transnational Markets  1
Making transnational markets: 
the institutional politics behind 
the TTIP
Marija Bartl*
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) may not bear 
fruit in its current incarnation, but it certainly teaches us crucial lessons 
regarding the institutional dynamics of market integration beyond 
the state. I argue that the TTIP’s so-called ‘regulatory cooperation’, in 
principle a mere mechanism for ‘discussion’ and ‘exchange’ between 
regulators, would have had a profound impact on the regulatory culture 
across the Atlantic. I make this argument in three interrelated steps. 
First, building on insights from constitutional law and political science, 
I outline an analytical framework for the study of rule-making institu-
tions beyond the state. Second, I analyse the TTIP through the lens of 
this framework, illustrating the mechanisms through which its model 
for regulatory cooperation could reform the regulatory culture in the 
EU. Third, I argue that this change in the EU regulatory culture would 
have been neither an accident, nor a result of a US-led hegemonic 
project. Instead, the TTIP’s regulatory cooperation is a part of the EU’s 
internal political struggle, intended ultimately to re-balance not only 
powers between the legislative and the executive in the EU, but also 
within the EU’s executive branch itself.
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1. Introduction
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), one of the 
biggest trade projects of recent times, is due to stall thanks to the changes 
in US administration. Whatever the ultimate destiny of the TTIP, we may 
safely assume that an institutional momentum of these proportions will 
not wane easily. It remains therefore crucial to continue discussing this 
path-breaking agreement.
More generally, the TTIP teaches us a lesson about the direction 
and dynamics of economic integration beyond the state, about actors with 
leading roles in this global game, and the legitimacy challenges posed 
by the form of cooperation. On a practical level, the TTIP will remain an 
important repository of institutional ideas that is likely to set the standard 
for future trade cooperation across, and beyond, the Atlantic.
What then sets the TTIP apart, and why was it so controver-
sial? In short, the main challenge has been the TTIP’s institutional 
dimension. In Europe, much criticism has been mobilized against the 
TTIP’s Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) scheme.1 Over time, 
however, another institutional mechanism has started to compete for 
attention. The so-called TTIP’s ‘regulatory cooperation’ has increasingly 
been noticed beyond the circle of EU institutions – by industry, civil 
society and academics.2
The TTIP’s regulatory cooperation was conceived as a set of insti-
tutional channels for the exchange of information, methodologies and 
knowledge between regulators on both sides of the Atlantic. This soft 
institutional design was driven by a belief that mutual engagement 
would allow regulators to learn from each other and align the ways in 
which they ‘think’. Such convergence of views would, in turn, encourage 
consistency in regulation, and eventually achieve the approximation of 
regulatory frameworks, so to speak, ‘bottom up’.
1 For a critical view of the TTIP ISDS chapter see for instance Harm Schepel et al, ‘Public 
Consultation on Investor–State Arbitration in TTIP’ (2015) https://www.kent.ac.uk/law/
isds_treaty_consultation.html. For a critique of (a certain hypocrisy) of ISDS critiques in the 
context of the TTIP, see Joseph Weiler, ‘European Hypocrisy: TTIP and ISDS’ EJIL Talk (21 
January 2015) http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-hypocrisy-ttip-and-isds.
2 Some examples: Civil Society: Corporate European Observatory (CEO), https://c o r p o r a t e 
e u r o p e .org/international-trade/2015/04/regulatory-cooperation-ttip-united-deregulation; 
https://corporateeurope.org/international-tr ade/2016/03/t t i p - regulatory-co operation-
threat-democracy; https://corporateeurope.org/international-tr ade/2016/05/ttip-lea ks- hi 
ghlight-dan gers-regulatory-cooperation. Many positions of the business vis-à-vis regulatory 
cooperation have been obtained from the European Commission by the NGOs, such as CEO, 
within the ‘Access to Documents’ procedure. See for instance https://www.asktheeu.org/
en/request/meeting_between_dg_envi_and_cefi?unfold=1-incoming-6452.
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The proponents of the TTIP saw regulatory cooperation as its most 
promising element. A study requested by the European Commission 
predicted that a big portion of the TTIP’s economic benefits would 
accrue from regulatory cooperation.3 A number of commentators 
also welcomed regulatory cooperation as an exciting new space for 
experimentation and learning.4 Opponents, in contrast, portrayed 
regulatory cooperation as a space that would allow industry to capture 
the regulatory process, sheltered in secretive discussions of technical 
committees and inaccessible to ordinary citizens.5 Finally, many lawyers 
underlined the continuity with the existing forms of cooperation beyond 
the state, remaining often sceptical about the bite of ‘soft’ forms of 
cooperation envisaged in regulatory cooperation.6
The aim of this article is to show that the TTIP’s regulatory 
cooperation is far more potent than a traditional legal analysis would 
  Academics: Joana Mendes, ‘Participation in a New Regulatory Paradigm: Collaboration 
and Constraint in TTIP’s Regulatory Cooperation’ (Orbilu 2016) http://orbilu.uni.lu/h a 
n d l e / 1 0 9 9 3/29428; Fernanda Nicola, ‘The Politicization of Legal Expertise in the TTIP 
Negotiation’ (2015) 78 LCP 175; Jonathan B Wiener and Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Future of 
International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global Policy 
Laboratory’ (2015) 78 LCP 103; Joana Mendes, ‘Regulatory Cooperation under TTIP: 
Rulemaking and the Ambiguity of Participation’ in Luca Pantaleo et al (eds), Tiptoeing 
to TTIP: What Kind of Agreement for What Kind of Partnership? (Centre for the Law of EU 
External Relations 2016).
3 See Key Findings, Center for Economic Policy and Research: Reducing Trans-Atlantic 
Barriers to Trade and Investment (London 2013) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf. This study has been commissioned by the European 
Commission and it has served to ground numerous subsequent claims as to the economic 
benefits of the TTIP.
4 Wiener and Alemanno (n 2); Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘EU Experimentalist Governance in Times 
of Crisis’ (2016) 39(5) W Eur Pol 1073. For a more general account of experimentalism 
in global governance see Gráinne De Búrca, Robert O Keohane and Charles Sabel, ‘Global 
Experimentalist Governance’ (2014) 3 B J Pol S 477. Equally, Global Administrative Law 
contribution to the TTIP debate could be added to this category. See for instance Richard 
Stewart, ‘State Regulatory Capacity and Administrative Law and Governance under 
Globalization’ (IILJ Working Paper 2016/1, 27 March 2016).
5 These concerns were advanced most prominently by NGOs such as Corporate European 
Observatory, or broader platforms such as alliance STOP TTIP. Of course, many scholars 
share some of those concerns, articulated often as problems of transparency, democratic 
legitimacy, participation etc. See for instance Ferdi De Ville and Gabriel Siles-Brügge, 
TTIP: The Truth about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Wiley 2015); 
Nicola (n 2); Marija Bartl and Elaine Fahey, ‘A Postnational Marketplace: Negotiating the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)’ in A Transatlantic Community of 
Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders (CUP 2014); 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung and Christiane Gerstetter et al, ‘Regulatory Cooperation under 
TTIP – a Risk for Democracy and National Regulation?’ (Ecologic Institute 2014) https://
www.boell.de/sites/default/files/ttip_study_regulatory_cooperation_under_ttip_1.pdf.
6 See for instance Gregory Shaffer, ‘Alternatives for Regulatory Governance Under 
TTIP: Building from the Past’ (2016) 22(3) Colum J Eur L, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2781188; Tamara Takács, ‘Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation 
in Trade: Objectives, Challenges and Instruments for Economic Governance’; James
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allow us to appreciate. I will argue that the TTIP’s regulatory cooperation 
has the capacity to transform EU regulatory culture. Yet this shift would 
hardly be an outcome of learning and experimentation in neutral TTIP 
institutions. The TTIP’s regulatory cooperation is designed in a way that 
would facilitate the shift of the EU toward the US regulatory model. What 
is more, such an outcome would not be a historical accident, or the 
result of a US-led hegemonic project: the TTIP regulatory cooperation is 
a political project driven from inside the European Commission, aimed 
to enforce political agendas currently put forth and implemented in 
Europe.
I will make this argument in three interrelated steps. In the 
first part of the article, I outline an analytical framework, which can 
be usefully employed for the analysis of the institutional design and 
dynamics in economic cooperation beyond the state. Beyond legal 
analysis, this analytical framework will draw on political science (new 
institutionalism) and science and technology studies, in order to add 
new angles of inquiry necessary to account for the functional and trans-
national character of economic integration via the TTIP.
In the second part of this article, I turn to the analysis of the 
TTIP’s institutional design. I will argue that the TTIP’s regulatory 
cooperation, aiming at enhancing trade and investment, governed by 
trade officials and ‘regulatory affairs officials’,7 and finally reliant on a 
set of instruments such as cost-benefit analysis, sets the ground for the 
shift of the EU toward the US-style regulatory practices.
In the third part of the article I reach beyond the TTIP’s institu-
tional design in order to add an additional political reason as to why 
we may expect the TTIP institutions to facilitate the shift toward the 
US-like regulatory style. Neither a historical accident, nor an outcome of 
a US hegemonic project (as many opponents would have it), the TTIP’s 
regulatory cooperation is a political project of certain sections of the 
European Commission, stirred to re-balance the powers among the EU 
institutions, and within the European Commission itself, reinforcing a 
certain political course in EU domestic affairs.
Mathis, ‘Addressing Transatlantic Regulatory Barriers: Can the US and the EU Create an 
Effective Equivalency Instrument?’ in E Fahey and D Curtin, A Transatlantic Community 
of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders (CUP 2014).
7 By regulatory affairs officials I mean those members of the governments which are 
responsible for what is called by the European Commission ‘regulatory analytics’. This 
includes the administration of impact assessments and regulation review. In the US, these 
are the representatives of the Office of Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and in Europe, the 
members of the Secretariat General of the European Commission. The cooperation among 
those officials has already been taking place for years. See for instance Nicola (n 2).
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2. A framework for transnational institutional analysis
It is perhaps commonplace to state that institutions are powerful. They 
mould the way in which we see and understand the world. Social insti-
tutions, such as family or culture, co-determine the way we attribute 
value and meaning to our lives and the lives of others. The education we 
receive refines and re-focuses our thinking. It gives us tools to analyse 
aspects of the world around us, to attribute value, or infer causal 
relations. It teaches us to see many things that we have not perceived 
before, but it also blinds us to many others. As we grow up we find 
ourselves involved in further ‘micro’ institutions, such as workplaces, 
which again, thanks to their internal structures and hierarchies, shape 
what we care about and how we should act on it. Political institu-
tions play a similar role: depending on their level of aggregation, they 
shape the way in which we see and talk about the world at large, and 
understand the particular tasks that we are called to accomplish.
Lawyers have been sensitive not only to the power of law in 
shaping the institutions we inhabit, but also to the influence these 
institutions have on us – through norms, rules, competences, powers, 
languages, disciplines. In what follows, I articulate a form of institu-
tional analysis, which will help us analyse how the legal-institutional 
design of various ‘fora’ for cooperation beyond the state – transnational 
institutions8 – influence the dynamics of engagement in these fora, 
with direct consequences for how we may expect these institutions to 
govern.
The proposed transnational institutional analysis builds on a 
traditional set of questions a constitutional or administrative lawyer 
would ask regarding the institutional design and functioning of institu-
tions, enriched by insights from other social sciences to account for a set 
of problems specifically encountered in institutional cooperation beyond 
the nation state. The framework I propose draws on insights from inter-
national relations, as related to the functionalist character of integration 
beyond the state.9 Further, the analysis will incorporate insights from 
political science and, more specifically, new institutionalism, in order to 
8 I use the term ‘transnational’ in order to suggest the broad range of institutions that can 
be analysed in this way – from classical international institutions to institutions that include 
both private and public actors.
9 David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics ([Published on behalf of] LSE [by] 
M Robertson 1975); Jean Monnet, Memoirs, translated by Richard Mayne (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday 1978); see also Peter L Lindseth, ‘Transatlantic Functionalism: New Deal Models 
and European Integration’, in Symposium, Historical Analysis of Law, in Critical Analysis of 
Law vol 2 (2015) 83.
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understand how various institutional incentives,10 as well as institutional 
culture,11 operate on actors who partake in these institutions. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, I rely on insights from science and 
technology studies to account for the impact of expertise and knowledge 
production practices.12 This is particularly important, because much of 
the legitimacy of international institutions comes from their claim to 
govern in common interest through (objective) knowledge.
I suggest that any such analysis of (emergent) institutions beyond 
the state needs to integrate three levels of analysis: the level of 
objectives (what is the purpose of the institution? why cooperate?), the 
level of institutional design (what kinds of fora are envisioned? who 
should take part?) and, finally, the level of ‘instruments’ or ‘techniques’ 
(what tools does an emergent institution have at its disposal in order 
to act on its purposes?). I address these three levels of analysis more 
specifically below.
2.1 objectives
The first step of transnational institutional analysis is to consider the 
possible influence of objectives that the emergent institutions are 
expected to pursue. While unavoidably indeterminate, such objectives 
have certain constraining force as to what institutions may do: not 
everything goes.13 Attributing particular objectives to an institution has 
at least two major consequences. First, the objectives provide normative 
10 Here I rely foremost on the tradition of ‘rational institutionalism’, which focuses on 
the strategic behaviour of actors in institutionalized contexts. Some very enlightened work 
in this tradition has already been done in the context of the European integration. See 
for instance Neil Fligstein and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constructing Polities and Markets: An 
Institutionalist Account of European Integration’ (2002) 107(5) Am J Soc 1206.
11 Insofar as the framework operates with concepts such as language and institutional 
culture, the main inspiration comes from the framework of ‘organizational institutionalism’. 
See for instance Walter W Powell and Paul J DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis (U Chicago P 2012); John L Campbell and Ove Kaj Pedersen, The 
Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis (Princeton UP 2001).
12 In this contribution I rely foremost on the American branch of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS), based at Harvard around Sheila Jasanoff. This school of thought (unlike its 
European counterpart) engages directly with legal and constitutional issues of governance 
through knowledge, science and technology. Some of the most relevant contributions for 
legal public are thought Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science 
and Social Order (Routledge 2004); David Winickoff et al, ‘Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: 
Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law’ (2005) 30 Yale J Intl L; Sheila Jasanoff, 
‘In a Constitutional Moment: Science and Social Order at the Millennium’, in Social Studies 
of Science and Technology: Looking Back, Ahead (Springer 2003) 155; Sheila Jasanoff, 
Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Harvard UP 2009).
13 In the EU, this discussion has mainly concentrated either on the question of its 
‘economic constitution’ of ‘economic asymmetry’. While many contributions have been
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and cognitive orientation, or simply language, in which an institution 
approaches the world. Second, and of no lesser importance, such 
purposes make ‘obvious’ a need for a particular kind of expertise.14
For instance, attributing to an institution the purpose of ‘liberal-
izing trade’ or of creating a ‘common market’ will impact:
1.  Concerns – that is to say, what the institution and its members are 
striving for. At a cognitive level, it orients the institution toward 
an object that it should study and know (trade or market or 
environment), while at the normative level it aims to influence how 
to act on this object of study.
2.  Language – the imputed ends impact the vocabulary which the 
institution will use. Such language is usually drawn from most 
‘useful’ kinds of knowledge as linked to the objectives of the 
institution. In our case, for instance, where the objective is 
to ‘liberalize trade and investment’, a particular economic and 
legal vocabulary will be employed, i.e. concepts such as ‘market’, 
‘barriers to trade’, ‘tariffs’, ‘competitiveness’, ‘protectionism’, ‘red 
tape’, ‘regulatory burdens’ etc.
3.  Expertise – the imputed ends also influence the kind of expertise 
that will be sought. Thus, in order to interpret what ‘trade’ and 
‘market’ require, actors seek expertise predominantly among trade 
lawyers or economists, and less so among, for instance, anthropolo-
gists. The objectives make obvious who has the most ‘generalist’ 
competence to speak authoritatively on what the institution’s 
made in this line of scholarship, here are just a few of the most relevant ones for my 
account: JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100(8) Yale LJ 2403; FW 
Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model’ (2002) 40(4) JCMS 645; Fritz W Scharpf, ‘The 
Asymmetry of European Integration, or Why the EU Cannot Be a “Social Market Economy”’ 
(2010) 8(2) Socioecon Rev 211; MP Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution: What If This Is 
as Good as It Gets?’, in European Constitutionalism – Beyond the State (CUP 2003); Gareth 
Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’ (2015) 21(1) 
Eur LJ; Daniel Augenstein, Integration through Law Revisited: The Making of the European 
Polity (Ashgate 2012); Phil Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal 
Market (CUP 2012).
14 The problem of bureaucratic expertise has been traditionally the object of administrative 
rather than constitutional law. One need not remind of major contributions to this literature 
by Max Weber or John M Gaus. More recent legal literature on epistemic challenges in 
global governance, which is of direct relevance for the account proposed in this article, 
has proliferated mainly in international law scholarship. An uncomprehensive list of this 
literature would include Andrew Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Reimagining the 
Global Economic Order (OUP 2011); David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and 
Expertise Shape Global Political Economy (Princeton UP 2016); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Global 
Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of Thought’, Presentation at Harvard 
Law School (5 March 2005); Andrew TF Lang, Legal Regimes and Professional Knowledges: 
The Internal Politics of Regime Definition (CUP 2012); Robert Howse, ‘Democracy, Science,
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purposes actually mean, and what will be done. Of course, at times 
other kinds of expertise will be necessary. For instance, in order 
to decide whether a GMO ban is an unjustified obstacle to trade, 
life-scientists or environmental experts will be summoned. Yet the 
question as to how much authority their statements will have, and 
how much the institution will be able to ‘learn’ from these experts, 
depends ultimately on its composition and rules of procedure, 
broadly understood.
2.2 the institutional design
The second level of institutional analysis concerns the institutional 
design. How is the cooperation to take place practically? At this level of 
analysis, we are interested in more static issues of institutional design, 
including established questions a constitutional lawyer would ask: who 
is sitting in emergent bodies, how many members will they have, what 
competences do they possess, what is their relation to other institutions, 
on various levels of governance, how representative (and representative 
of what) the institutions are, which actors can gain access, and on what 
grounds etc.
a)  The relation between objectives and expertise in transnational 
institutions. 
  Beyond these conventional – albeit crucial – questions, I would like 
to suggest that the analyst of transnational institutions needs to 
reach beyond law in order to identify other possible elements that 
are of particular importance for the institutional design of such 
institutions. I have argued elsewhere15 that one such element is to 
be found in a specific pattern of international institution-building – 
along functionalist lines – that has been predominant throughout 
the twentieth century.16
  The design of many international institutions has followed a 
similar pattern: a broad objective (such as the liberalization of 
 and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade Organization’ (2000) 98(7) 
Mich L Rev 2329; Robert Howse, ‘From Politics to Technocracy and Back Again: the Fate 
of the Multilateral Trading Regime’ (2002) 96(1) AJIL 94; Winickoff et al (n 12); M Bartl, 
‘Regulatory Convergence through the Back Door: TTIP’s Regulatory Cooperation and the 
Future of Precaution in Europe’, Ger Law J, forthcoming 2017.
15 Marija Bartl, ‘Internal Market Rationality, Private Law and the Direction of the Union: 
Resuscitating the Market as the Object of the Political’ (2015) 21(5) Eur LJ.
16 Mitrany (n 9); Monnet (n 9); see also Peter L Lindseth, ‘Transatlantic Functionalism: 
New Deal Models and European Integration’ (2015) 2(1) CALJ 83.
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trade, or promotion of human rights, or economic development 
etc.) and a set of usually expert institutions, which were supposed 
to implement this goal, with a stronger or weaker oversight by its 
state parties. In this context, expertise has played an important 
legitimizing role in integration beyond the state: the putative lack 
of (democratic) legitimacy was to be cured by objective, apolitical, 
expert decision-making.17
  What then are the compound implications of purposive and 
expert character of transnational institutions? It is commonplace to 
say that certain kinds of knowledge and expertise illuminate certain 
kinds of issues, questions, perspectives or concerns, while at the 
same time conceal others.18 Constitutional law theory in a liberal 
democratic state need not be particularly concerned with such 
‘blind spots’ of expertise because of the state’s overall institutional 
design. In principle a liberal democratic state is not tied to specific 
(sets of) objectives or purposes but rather entertains a broad range 
of undefined goals and ends.19 Even if these goals are articulated 
through specialized bureaucracies (defence, finance, environment, 
education etc.), the hierarchy between the ‘framings’ of the world 
that underpin these sections of bureaucracy is not pre-determined. 
Rather, the relative weight attributed to any such goal, with the 
knowledge that underpins it, is, at least very broadly, left for the 
political process to establish, and ultimately kept in check through 
the periodic alternation of governments.20
  Beyond the state, however, the institutional framework changes 
profoundly. The ‘functionalist’ forms of integration not only sever 
bureaucratic expertise from more overt forms of democratic control, 
but by constituting them around purposes, expertise’s blind spots 
17 Bartl (n 15).
18 There are many whom we would have to thank for this insight. Perhaps the person 
to mention here is Michel Foucault, whose contribution has done much to make this 
claim common-sense knowledge today. Among many contributions, two deserve to be 
singled out here. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (Springer 2007) and 
Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978–1979 
(Springer 2010).
19 In the category of liberal democratic states I include also federal states, such as 
Germany or the US. While these have often objectives and competences divided between 
federal and state levels, which may liken them to functionalist entities beyond the state, 
they are qualitatively different. This is the case for two main reasons: the lesser dependence 
on expertise on the input side, due to their thicker political legitimacy, and the broader space 
for political action on the output side, thanks to their greater capacity for redistribution and 
solidarity (spending powers). Similarly also Peter L Lindseth, ‘The Perils of “As If” European 
Constitutionalism’ (2016) 22(5) Eur LJ 696.
20 Along similar lines also G Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of 
Purposive Competence’ (2013) 21(1) Eur LJ 2.
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may turn into outright policy biases. Christian Joerges, for instance, 
has persuasively argued that the combination of internal market 
competence and a claim to expertise has allowed the European 
Commission to attract and marketize a number of issues, which 
stood ‘diagonally’ to its purposive legal basis.21 And political 
scientist Nicolas Jabko has shown how the European Commission 
has strategically used ‘marketization’ to expand its powers.22 The 
transnational institutional analysis, then, should identify any possi-
bilities of such skewed incentives if it is to contribute to limiting 
governance biases.
b)  The relation between objectives and standing in transnational 
institutions.
  Access to institutions, in principle (in books) and even more 
importantly in practice, has been found to have great significance 
for the development of law and jurisprudence.23 Equally, political 
science scholarship has shown that ‘standing’ or ‘access’ has been a 
major driver in political integration. In a prominent analysis of the 
European Court of Justice, Fligstein and Stone Sweet have shown 
the crucial role the ‘stakeholders’, primarily businesses, have played 
in the European integration.24 Others have analysed the access of 
actors to the European Commission25 and its agencies,26 showing 
that the sharing of concerns and language has a profound impact 
on who can influence decision-making in the EU.27
21 The concept of ‘diagonal conflicts’ describes a situation where the EU takes up an 
issue because of its internal market/economic dimension, even if we would not have 
‘normally’ conceived of such an issue as an economic one (such as public education, health, 
or a right to strike). See C Joerges, ‘Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private 
Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline’ (2004) 14(2) Duke J Comp & Intl L 149.
22 Nicolas Jabko, Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985–2005 
(Cornell UP 2006).
23 Access to justice is one of the internationally recognized human rights; questions of 
legal standing have accompanied the fight of various peoples, minorities and suppressed 
communities in order to gain societal recognition.
24 Fligstein and Stone Sweet (n 10).
25 Beate Kohler-Koch and Christine Quittkat, De-Mystification of Participatory Democracy: 
EU-Governance and Civil Society (OUP 2013); Beate Kohler-Koch, ‘How to Put Matters Right? 
Assessing the Role of Civil Society in EU Accountability’ (2010) 33(5) W Eur Pol 1117.
26 Marjolein BA van Asselt, Ellen Vos and Bram Rooijackers, Science, Knowledge 
and Uncertainty in EU Risk Regulation (UCL Press/Cavendish 2009); Maria Weimer, 
‘Risk Regulation and Deliberation in EU Administrative Governance – GMO Regulation 
and Its Reform’ (2015) 21(5) Eur LJ 622; Marjolein BA van Asselt and Ellen Vos, ‘The 
Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty Paradox’ (2006) 9(4) J Risk Research 313; 
S Borrás, ‘Legitimate Governance of Risk at the EU Level? The Case of Genetically Modified 
Organisms’ (2006) 73(1) Technol Forecast and Soc Change 61.
27 Benjamin Farrand, ‘Lobbying and Lawmaking in the European Union: The Development 
of Copyright Law and the Rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’ (2015) 
35(3) OJLS 487.
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  The importance of standing, and of access to institutions, is 
quite obvious to (constitutional) lawyers. Giving equal voice to all 
citizens is both the normative and the epistemic foundation of the 
representativeness of political institutions. If, in contrast, certain 
groups of actors enjoy privileged access, not only is the normative 
commitment to political equality challenged, but also the epistemo-
logical basis of policies is compromised, insofar as a limited group 
dictates what issues/agenda should be discussed, and how they 
should be framed. The identification of asymmetries in standing 
and access is a core element of transnational institutional analysis.
c)  The relation between objectives and (political) geography in 
transnational institutions.
  Political economists, social theorists and political geographers 
have analysed, through their own theoretical and methodological 
lenses, the role of ‘space’ in integration beyond the state. Some have 
noted that such integration has created and re-created new and old 
‘centres and peripheries’. In a persuasive analysis, Damjan Kukovec 
shows the role played by European law in re-enforcing such 
dynamics in the EU.28 Saskia Sassen, by contrast, shows that the 
allegedly virtual global market is in fact re-embedded in a few cities 
around the world, allowing those present there to dictate the terms 
of global economic integration.29 Equally, few would doubt that the 
decision-making of the European Central Bank would be different if 
the ECB were located in Athens instead of Frankfurt.30
  The relation of political geography and political accountability 
should become one of the centres of transnational institutional 
analysis. In the following analysis of the TTIP, I do not touch on this 
issue directly; however, a number of interesting analyses of the role 
of space for TTIP already exist. Several commentators, for instance, 
believe that the benefits of integration will not accrue to all in the 
same way.31
28 Damjan Kukovec, ‘A Critique of the Rhetoric of Common Interest in the EU Legal 
Discourse’ SSRN (2012); Damjan Kukovec, ‘Law and the Periphery’ (2015) 21(3) Eur LJ 406.
29 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton UP 2001); Saskia 
Sassen, ‘The State and Globalization’ (2002) 85 CSIR 91.
30 Marija Bartl, ‘Contesting Austerity: On the Limits of EU Knowledge Governance’ 
(2017) 44(1) J Law Soc 150.
31 For an excellent analysis of the TTIP induced centre–periphery dynamics by economists, 
see Werner Raza et al, ‘Modelling the Impacts of Trade on Employment and Development: 
A Structuralist CGE-Model for the Analysis of TTIP and Other Trade Agreements’ (Working 
Paper, Austrian Foundation for Development Research (ÖFSE) 2016) https://www.
econstor.eu/handle/10419/144538. For an analysis by two political scientists, see De Ville 
and Siles-Brügge (n 5). In the same direction also Joseph Weiler, European Hypocrisy: TTIP 
and ISDS (21 January 2015) http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-hypocrisy-ttip-and-isds.
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2.3 instruments
Finally, the third element that should be included in any systematic 
analysis of (transnational) institutions is a focus on ‘instruments’, or 
techniques of government, which institutions use in order to act on their 
objectives. From census to statistics and cost-benefit analysis, societies 
have developed numerous modes of visibility and calculability that 
allow these institutions to see, and govern, their subjects.32
While many of such instruments have spread from powerful states 
to the broader world (‘norm exporters’),33 they have usually been 
re-shaped by the receiving political institutions so as to reflect their 
goals and normative commitments.34 Thus, for instance, ‘participation’, 
‘stakeholders’, ‘transparency’,35 ‘scientific evidence’36 or ‘cost-benefit 
analysis’37 mean very different things in different political entities, or 
at different points of time. Comparative law scholarship has constantly 
been sensitive to any such claims of difference, or conversely, similarity.
In line with our previous discussion of the role of expertise, these 
various instruments need to be appreciated both for their cognitive 
as well as political significance. First, they are the tools for the 
production of knowledge, i.e. they uncover certain aspects of reality 
while concealing others. Second, they may have differential impacts 
on the possibilities for participation among various actors and groups. 
Third, their centrality is particularly resonant beyond the state, where 
they often promise to ‘bind’ and thus legitimate the exercise of power.38 
The focus on instruments and their capacity to produce objective 
32 In this field, again the STS and a history of science are helpful to appreciate the political 
relevance of the ‘instruments’ of government. See for instance Alain Desrosières, ‘How to 
Make Things Which Hold Together: Social Science, Statistics and the State’, in Discourses 
on Society (Springer 1990); Theodore M Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity 
in Science and Public Life (Princeton UP 1996); Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals 
of Verification (OUP 1997). More specifically in legal scholarship, many contributions have 
dealt with the politics of CBA. For instance Duncan Kennedy, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Entitlement Problems: A Critique’ (1981) 33 Stanford L Rev 387; Frank Ackerman and 
Lisa Heinzerling, ‘Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection’ 
(2002) 150(5) U Penn L Rev 1553; Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On 
Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (New Press 2005).
33 Mark B Baker, ‘No Country Left Behind: The Exporting of US Legal Norms under the 
Guise of Economic Integration’ (2005) 19 Emory Intl L Rev 1321.
34 Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht J Eur & 
Comp L 111.
35 Nicola (n 2).
36 Jasanoff, ‘The Idiom of Co-Production’, in States of Knowledge (n 12).
37 Nicola (n 2).
38 The OECD has been one of the major promoters of ‘good regulatory practices’ as a tool 
to discipline, and thus legitimize, domestic governance. See OECD Recommendation of The
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knowledge, and qua knowledge also governance, is the core element of 
the transnational institutional analysis.
3. Making the TTIP
In the following part I analyse the TTIP’s regulatory cooperation 
in light of the foregoing framework for transnational institutional 
analysis, including TTIP’s objectives, institutional design of regulatory 
cooperation and important instruments available to achieve the TTIP’s 
objectives. Let me start, however, with a few words regarding TTIP’s 
regulatory cooperation.
Regulatory cooperation comprises a set of institutions and insti-
tutional channels, which should allow the trading parties to engage in 
regulatory exchange and cooperation, without a need to open official 
treaty negotiation39 – thus making the TTIP a ‘living agreement’.40 The 
main idea is that by creating institutional channels for the exchange 
of information, methodologies and knowledge between regulators 
and stakeholders across the Atlantic, their ‘thinking’ would align, thus 
minimizing the numbers of divergent regulations.
Regulatory cooperation has been one of the most important 
elements of the TTIP agreement.41 Because most of the economic 
benefits of the agreement accrue by removing ‘behind the borders’ 
barriers to trade,42 the costs of which run into hundreds of billions 
of euros,43 regulatory cooperation becomes crucial for delivering on 
that economic promise.44 Equally, geo-political motives have fuelled 
Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance (2012) http://www.oecd.org/governance/
regulatory-policy/49990817.pdf.
39 Mendes, ‘Participation’ (n 2).
40 For ambitions of the Commission with regard to the TTIP, see a landmark speech of 
DG Commissionaire De Gucht (10 October 2013) http://europa.eu/rapid/p r e s s - r e l e a s e _ S 
P E E C H - 13-801_en.htm.
41 The Report of the High Level Working Group on the Transatlantic Relations, which 
was a pretext for the start of the TTIP negotiations http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf.
42 See the Study of the CEPR London: Reducing Trans-Atlantic Barriers to Trade and 
Investment (2013) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.
pdf. One of the key findings: ‘Reducing non-tariff barriers will be a key part of transatlantic 
liberalisation. As much as 80% of the total potential gains come from cutting costs imposed 
by bureaucracy and regulations, as well as from liberalising trade in services and public 
procurement.’
43 ibid.
44 The European Commission explains:
   the European and American systems of regulation are among the most advanced 
and sophisticated in the world. They effectively protect people, and in most 
instances to a similar extent, although often in different ways. This also means
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the idea that global standards should be set by the US–EU, in order to 
maintain their economic power and enable a sort of ‘economic NATO’.45
Regulatory cooperation in the TTIP envisages three types of 
regulatory exchanges. First, ‘bilateral exchange’ takes place between 
sectoral regulators or authorities at the central/federal level, at the 
counter-party behest. Secondly, the TTIP creates an ‘institutional 
mechanism’ that coordinates the implementation of the agreement. 
Finally, it creates sectoral committees, which engage regularly in 
exchanges regarding particular sectors, such as finance or sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS). The analysis put forward in sections 3 
and 4 (below) applies mutatis mutandis to the CETA’s regulatory 
cooperation.46
3.1 the ttiP’s objectives
The TTIP, a trade and investment partnership between the EU and 
the US, is concerned with the liberalization of trade and investment 
across the Atlantic. The first question that the analysis requires is to ask 
whether and how this objective would influence the operation of the 
TTIP institutions.
That this is not a redundant question is corroborated by one of 
the core criticisms of the TTIP, namely, that the TTIP will frame the 
cooperation between the EU–US cooperation in a way that will prioritize 
trade and investment at the expense of other normative concerns, such 
as labour or environment.47 This critique has been particularly sharp 
with respect to the TTIP’s ‘regulatory cooperation’ framework.48
The European Commission has made great efforts to make clear 
that pursuing the goal of liberalization of trade and investment will 
   that there is a great deal of potential for regulatory cooperation to create new 
economic opportunities and greater consumer choice. It should also lead to better 
quality, more thoroughly enforced regulation, and increase our ability to influence 
the quality of global rules.
 See European Commission, ‘TTIP and Regulation: An Overview’ (10 February 2015) 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153121.pdf.
45 A phrase attributed to Hillary Clinton.
46 There are some differences between the institutional design of the CETA 
(Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement) and the TTIP regulatory cooperation. 
CETA regulatory cooperation is, for instance, based on voluntariness of exchange, while 
TTIP regulatory cooperation requires engaging in exchange, however, without committing 
parties to any particular regulatory outcomes: Bartl (n 14).
47 See for instance Stiftung and Gerstetter (n 5); also Corporate European Observatory, 
Dangerous Regulatory Duet (2016) http://corporateeurope.org/i n t e r n a t i o n a l - tr ade/ 2016/ 
01/dangerous-regulatory-duet.
48 See above (n 2).
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not impact negatively on other normative concerns. According to the 
Commission:
By cooperating more efficiently, and from early on, regulators will 
be able to benefit from sharing resources and expertise to reach 
their public policy objectives whilst avoiding unnecessary 
duplications and barriers for trade and investment.49
According to a proposal published in March 2016,50 the objectives of 
regulatory cooperation are:
a) to establish and strengthen bilateral regulatory cooperation …
b)  to contribute to parties’ activities pursuing public 
policy … in
 a. public health …
 b. environment
 c. consumers
 …
whilst facilitating trade and investment.
c) to promote effective regulatory environment …
d)  to promote compatible regulatory approaches and reduce 
unnecessarily burdensome, duplicative or divergent regulatory 
requirements …
e)  to further the development and implementation of internation-
ally agreed regulatory documents …
In order to establish whether these legal provisions are an effective 
tool to counter such normative drift, let us consider how a ‘bilateral 
exchange’, a most promising framework for pursuing ‘race to the top’ 
cooperation between the two trading partners,51 would operate. We 
will do so by considering one counter-factual: How likely is it that, for 
instance, a Directorate-General (DG) Environment and Environmental 
Protection Agency, could jointly foster measures of environmental 
protection through bilateral exchange?
49 European Commission, ‘Regulatory Cooperation in the TTIP, an Introduction to the EU 
Revised Proposal’ (21 March 2016) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/
tradoc_154378.pdf.
50 European Commission, ‘Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation’ (21 March 2016) 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154377.pdf.
51 Since bilateral exchanges should take place between various sectoral regulators, 
with the least involvement of trade officials or regulatory affairs officials, they seem most 
suitable for pursuing non-trade normative concerns.
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In order to respond to this question, and referring back to our 
analytical framework, we need to ask several questions. Which concerns 
will be discussed in bilateral exchange? How will these concerns become 
concerns? In what language will the issues and discussion be framed? 
Whose expertise and participation will be sought?
Bilateral cooperation commences on the proposal of one trading 
party if it suspects that the measure proposed by the other party may 
be a barrier to trade or investment. For example, a party may call for 
bilateral exchange if it suspects that a measure limiting the importation 
of shale gas is an unjustified restriction of trade.
First, there are important cognitive and normative consequences 
that accrue by framing the limitation of imports of shale gas as a barrier 
to trade – as opposed to, for instance, an environmental protection 
measure. A plethora of concepts, discourses and knowledge will be 
mobilized by such a framing. For instance, concepts such as trade 
barriers, protectionism, competitiveness, level playing field, economic 
theories of various sorts, cost-benefit analysis and statistics will be 
discussed, but also trade law expertise, impact assessment expertise, 
economic expertise and so on will be sought. The environmental agencies 
themselves may even need ‘external’ expertise, or advice, in order to 
understand these sorts of arguments. This framing effect means that 
articulating joint environmental objectives will not be straightforward.
A second crucial question is how issues become a subject of 
bilateral exchange in the first place. By whom and how are these 
concerns identified? The group relied upon to identify potential barriers 
to trade, and bring them to their prospective national regulators and 
authorities, are stakeholders.52 In order to support stakeholders in this 
function, both parties will be also expected to publish comprehensive 
lists of their planned regulatory acts, identifying issues that may present 
a concern for transatlantic trade.
It is likely that the majority of stakeholders who would avail 
themselves of the opportunity to bring issues to bilateral exchange 
will be business stakeholders.53 An NGO could in principle bring a 
proposal for a bilateral exchange; however, there would be very few 
incentives to do so. First, any such proposal would have to come 
packaged in the language of ‘barriers to trade’. Second, it would have 
to count on involvement of industry across the Atlantic. We may safely 
assume that industry stakeholders would make sure that the regulators 
52 See section 3.3 (below).
53 See section 3.3 (below).
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involved in the transatlantic bilateral exchange would not act ultra 
vires and produce outcomes that would be unfavourable to trade. Such 
constraint would, in turn, considerably limit the kinds of suggestions 
that the NGOs could put forward. But even more importantly, the NGOs 
would have little incentive to raise issues for bilateral exchange (instead 
of approaching their national regulators or legislators) because the 
outcomes of bilateral exchange would not have legal effects. Taking 
positive action, such as parallel harmonization of standards upwards, 
would require the involvement of many other institutions.54 The 
TTIP institutional framework is in contrast foremost suited for taking 
negative action – deciding that a measure should not be pursued or 
enacted – thus having a definite de- regulatory tinge.55
3.2 the institutional design of regulatory cooperation
Until very recently, the Commission’s crown institution of regulatory 
cooperation was the Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB), tasked with 
monitoring, implementation and agenda-setting, not least through 
the so-called Annual Regulatory Cooperation Programme. Met with 
hesitance on the US side, the Commission’s March position paper56 
discusses this body only in general terms, under the uninspiring title 
‘Institutional mechanism’. The recent July position paper57 brings 
important changes, which can be interpreted as accommodating US 
demands. The July papers also count on a strong Joint Committee, while 
the Regulatory Cooperation Body has turned into the Transatlantic 
Regulators’ Forum, with somewhat less articulated competences and 
powers. The strengthening of sectoral working groups (discussed in the 
following part) is perhaps the most important response to US demands.
The Joint Committee is a main TTIP institution, which would 
have considerable powers. Its aim is to further enhance the objectives 
of the agreement – trade, investment and regulatory cooperation. Its 
powers include an important competence to ‘adopt decisions or make 
recommendations suitable for promoting the expansion of trade and 
investment as envisaged in this Agreement’, or ‘adopt the interpreta-
tions of this Agreement, which shall be binding on the parties, including 
54 See also section 3.3 (below).
55 See also De Ville and Siles-Brügge (n 5).
56 European Commission (n 50).
57 European Commission, ‘EU Textual Proposal for Institutional, General and 
Final Provisions’ (14 July 2016) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/july/
tradoc_154802.pdf.
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panels established under Chapter XX’ (Investment Chapter). Further, 
a Joint Committee would guide and facilitate regulatory cooperation, 
coordinate sectoral committees and working groups established by 
the agreement, as well as have the power to establish new groups and 
terminate older ones. Finally, when it comes to regulatory cooperation, 
the Joint Committee can make recommendation to the Transatlantic 
Regulators’ Forum as to the content of its agenda, and organize a yearly 
session on regulatory cooperation.
In comparison with the previously proposed Regulatory 
Cooperation Body, the Transatlantic Regulators’ Forum would have 
fewer powers, since many of its previously envisaged powers have been 
transferred to the Joint Committee and to sectoral committees (see 
section 3.2.1 below). Among the remaining powers, the Transatlantic 
Regulators’ Forum would still set the agenda for regulatory cooperation, 
including identifying new initiatives and monitoring on-going regulatory 
cooperation (bilateral, but also sectoral cooperation). It would also 
draw a yearly plan of regulatory cooperation, the so-called ‘Joint 
Overview of EU/US Regulatory Cooperation’ – a document previously 
discussed as the Annual Regulatory Cooperation Program.
3.2.1  What kind of expertise?
A traditional question that one would ask when it comes to establishing 
institutions is that of composition. As underlined in section 2.1 in this 
article, in the context of integration beyond the state, the question 
regarding the composition should also include institutional affiliation 
and disciplinary expertise of the participants. This aspect is fundamental 
in the context of transnational institutional analysis, because there 
is a comparatively greater risk that narrowly defined expertise may 
prejudice broader economic and social policies. When it comes to the 
composition of the proposed institutions:
The Joint Committee shall be co-chaired by the United States 
Trade Representative and the Member of the European 
Commission responsible for Trade, or their respective designees.58
 …
 A Transatlantic Regulators’ Forum (the “Forum”) is hereby 
established. The Forum shall meet no later than one year after 
entry into force of the Agreement. The Forum shall meet at 
least once a year or at the request from either Party. It shall 
58 ibid.
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be composed of Senior Officials of both Parties responsible for 
cross-cutting issues of regulatory policy and good regulatory 
practices, senior officials responsible for international trade, and 
senior regulators for the areas they are responsible for.59
A first issue one notes is a certain ‘naturalness’ that accompanies the 
institutional design of the TTIP institutions. Given that the TTIP is a 
trade agreement, with the objective to liberalize trade and investment, 
the demand for certain expertise and institutional affiliation becomes 
obvious. Thus, it seems only logical that documents single out trade 
officials as the leaders of the Joint Committee and Transatlantic 
Regulators’ Forum. It is also not surprising that the latter singles out 
regulatory affairs officials,60 insofar as the TTIP is meant to achieve 
regulatory cooperation through harmonizing regulatory methodolo-
gies.61 These two groups of officials seemingly possess a more ‘general’ 
competence with respect to the fields dealt with by the TTIP. By contrast, 
officials who possess different expertise, such as environmental officials, 
will be invited to participate only if an issue is of direct concern to them.
What are the consequences of this institutional design on the kind 
of exchanges that occur? Domestically, giving privileged access to the 
TTIP’s institutions to trade officials and regulatory affairs officials will 
empower the trade departments’ representatives and those officials who 
possess skills in ‘regulatory analytics’ (OIRA, the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs, in the US and the Secretariat General in the 
European Commission).
What stands out as normatively relevant with respect to these two 
groups of officials is that they broadly share a similar framing of the 
world – both groups see the world as a market. In such a framing of 
the world, the problem – or the disrupted harmony – comes from either 
barriers to trade (trade officials) or unnecessary regulation/red tape 
(regulatory affairs officials). In turn, to restore harmony, the barriers to 
trade or red tape need to be removed, or at least transformed.
Additionally, this cognitive framework will likely be shared by 
these groups of officials across the Atlantic, including at least the way in 
59 ibid.
60 By ‘regulatory affairs officials’, I mean those members of the governments which 
are responsible for what is called by the European Commission ‘regulatory analytics’. 
This includes the administration of impact assessments and regulation review. In the US, 
these are the representatives of the Office of Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), and in Europe the 
members of the Secretariat General of the European Commission. The cooperation among 
those officials has already been taking place for years. See for instance Nicola (n 2).
61 See section 4 (below).
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which they define problems and consider a range of possible solutions. 
Making these two groups of officials quasi-permanent members of 
the Joint Committee and Transatlantic Regulators’ Forum, with regular 
opportunities for them to socialize, will further enhance their acculturation 
and normative congruence.62 By contrast, more incidental ‘issue specific’ 
officials are expected to meet from time to time only in the Joint Committee 
and Transatlantic Regulators’ Forum. Such officials are likely to remain an 
‘out-group’, whose contributions may be confronted with settled normative 
positions of the trade officials and regulatory affairs officials.
The described institutional context surely does not constitute 
a neutral space for exchange and learning among regulators. Unless 
remedied, the overrepresentation of trade officials and regulatory 
affairs officials is likely to negatively impact the development of 
balanced normative agenda in the TTIP’s institutions.63
3.2.2  Heightened challenge: the proliferation of sectoral committees
The contraction of powers of the Transatlantic Regulators’ Forum has 
been compensated for by the establishment of a set of similar regulatory 
institutions, restricted however to particular sectors. In contrast to 
general TTIP institutions, the US has been particularly ambitious 
with regard to the (institutional design of) sectoral committees.64 The 
Commission’s latest proposal puts in place several ‘sectoral committees’, 
including:
(a)  the Market Access Committee; with subcommittees on Public 
procurement, Energy and Raw materials and Intellectual 
property rights;
(b) the Committee on Services and Investment;
(c) the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development; 
(d) the Committee on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises; 
(e) the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade;
(f)  the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; 
(g) the Joint Customs Cooperation Committee.65
62 James Kwak, ‘Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis’, in Preventing Regulatory 
Capture (CUP 2013) 71; Andrew Baker, ‘Restraining Regulatory Capture? Anglo-America, 
Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance’ (2010) 86(3) Intl 
Affairs 647. Along somewhat similar lines, see also Peter Drahos, The Global Governance of 
Knowledge: Patent Offices and Their Clients (CUP 2010).
63 Compare for instance Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (Springer 2007).
64 See Greenpeace, TTIP-leaks.org; see chapters on Regulatory Cooperation or SPS 
Measures https://www.ttip-leaks.org/andromache/doc11.pdf.
65 European Commission (n 57).
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The ‘composition, remit, tasks and functioning of the specialised 
committees shall be as defined in the relevant Chapters and Protocols 
of this Agreement or by the Joint Committee’.66 Certain competences 
identified by chapters and protocols include exchange on issues that 
threaten to undermine trade and investment in their relevant fields, 
identifying possibilities for regulatory cooperation, monitoring the 
implementation of the agreement in their sector and reporting to the 
main coordinating body, all discussed above.
Let us look at one of those sectoral committees, namely the 
sectoral Committee for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. This is a 
very important committee insofar as it will be responsible for exchange 
regarding GMOs and ‘modern agricultural technology’.67 Even if the 
exact wording remains unresolved, both trade partners agree as to the 
basic composition of this committee:
[EU: The Parties hereby establish a Joint Management Committee 
(JMC) for SPS Measures, hereafter called the Committee, compro-
mising regulatory and trade representatives of each Party who 
have responsibility for SPS measures.]
[US: The Parties hereby establish a Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Matters (the “Committee”) compromising repre-
sentatives of each Party. … Each Party shall ensure that its repre-
sentatives on the Committee are the appropriate officials from its 
relevant trade agencies or ministries and competent authorities 
with responsibility for the development, implementation, and 
enforcement of SPS measures.]68
The US envisages a strong SPS committee. Thus, the US proposal states 
that the committee should possess formal decision-making powers and 
be able to reject or modify measures submitted to it by either party. In 
a case of such a negative opinion, parties should be able to reverse it 
only if they comply with higher justificatory obligation.69 The US has 
also proposed a ‘working group on trade in products of modern agri-
cultural technologies’ to discuss issues relevant to the biotech industry 
(including, most notably, issues related to genetic modification). 
Additionally, this group would be co-chaired by representatives of each 
66 ibid.
67 See Greenpeace (n 64), chapter on SPS Measures.
68 ibid.
69 ibid.
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party’s trade agency.70 Finally, the US has proposed standing ‘technical 
working groups’ to resolve disputes regarding the applicable science and 
understanding of the relevant risks in animal health, plant health and 
food safety.71 Even if the European Commission has not accepted these 
proposals, it has accepted the need for ‘technical consultation’ in the 
case of divergent opinions of the two parties.72
Whatever the exact shape that this committee, or its technical 
working groups, would take, trade officials and regulatory affairs 
officials would be exceptionally well represented. This raises, thus, 
similar concerns to those discussed in relation to the general TTIP 
bodies. Moreover, in the context of the SPS chapter, the direct 
engagement of trade officials and regulatory affairs officials with science 
and scientific standards allows for the replication of disciplinary and 
institutional bias in the way science is utilized: an issue that is of crucial 
importance for regulatory policy in the EU and the future of the precau-
tionary principle.73
Last but not least, the proliferation of various sectoral committees 
and technical working groups in the context of the TTIP may 
present an accountability nightmare.74 The sheer numbers of powerful 
sectoral bodies will make any parliamentary oversight difficult, if not 
impossible, yet all the more important. Considering the lip service 
that the TTIP institutional chapter pays to transatlantic parliamentary 
cooperation in Article 6, there is a demonstrable lack of meaningful 
concern for the democratic implications of the proposed institutional 
structures.
3.3 instruments
The last level of proposed institutional analysis looks at the ‘instruments’ 
through which we govern, and are governed. Analysing the role of 
instruments is all the more important in the context of the TTIP since 
their alignment has been at the core of the TTIP project since its earliest 
70 ibid.
71 ibid.
72 ibid.
73 Bartl (n 14).
74 While parliaments on both sides of the Atlantic were able to gain some voice in 
the negotiation of various transatlantic treaties (see Davor Jancˇic´, ‘The Role of the 
European Parliament and the US Congress in Shaping Transatlantic Relations: TTIP, NSA 
Surveillance, and CIA Renditions: Parliaments in Transatlantic Relations’ (2016) 54(4) 
JCMS 896), the proliferation of various bodies, including multiple sectoral committees, 
without direct representation of parliamentarians envisaged, would render the possibility 
of parliamentary oversight illusory.
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days.75 The last Commission’s position paper on ‘good regulatory 
practices’ details rules on transparency, planning, stakeholder consulta-
tion, impact assessments, risk assessment and management, retrospec-
tive evaluation of regulatory acts and, finally, an obligation to establish 
an internal coordination mechanism (similar to the OIRA in the US, 
or the new Regulatory Scrutiny Board with similar powers to that of 
OIRA).76
While all the instruments would deserve a separate treatment, for 
the reasons of space I have to single out only two of these instruments 
for the analysis here, namely, stakeholder participation on the one 
hand and regulatory impact assessments (RIAs), including cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA), on the other.
3.3.1  Stakeholders as market builders
The focus on stakeholder participation and the transparency of the 
regulatory process across the Atlantic has been noteworthy. The 
foremost concern of the TTIP’s creators has been to ensure stakeholder 
access to the regulatory process from the earliest possible moment. Both 
trading parties seem to have agreed that stakeholders should have a 
say not only in the designs of particular measures but also with respect 
to the setting of priorities – in TTIP regulatory cooperation as well 
as in the domestic regulatory process.77 Moreover, the Commission’s 
recent proposal requires such access not only ex ante, in the process 
of preparing regulations, but also ex post, at the stage of review of 
legislation, whereby stakeholders can express their concerns that certain 
regulations no longer serve legitimate objectives. The Commission’s 
proposal resonates with the better regulation agenda’s concern for the 
review of existing regulation.
One of the concerns raised by civil society, and supported 
by empirical research, is that in the past stakeholder participation, 
both in the EU and even more so in the US, has usually meant a 
pervasive dominance of more concentrated interests – industry – at 
the expense of diffuse and less resourceful interests (be they public 
or smaller businesses).78 This influence has been exercised through 
75 The Report of the High Level Working Group on the Transatlantic Relations, which 
was a pretext for the start of the TTIP negotiations http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf.
76 European Commission, ‘Textual Proposal on Good Regulatory Practices’ http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154380.pdf.
77 Compare Greenpeace (n 64) and European Commission (n 76).
78 Wendy E Wagner, ‘Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture’ 
(2010) 59 Duke LJ 1321; Beate Kohler-Koch and Christine Quittkat, De-Mystification of
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various channels. Except for more overt forms of regulatory capture, 
the comment and notice procedure has enabled ‘information capture’, 
which is said to have disempowered US regulators to meaningfully 
regulate.79 In both the EU and the US, the reliance on knowledge and 
resources coming from business has involved softer, but powerful, 
forms of ‘cognitive capture’ and ‘cultural capture’.80
On a most general level, the TTIP brings new actors not only to its 
own institutions and regulatory exchanges, but also into the domestic 
regulatory process. Along with the general category of stakeholders, we 
may see US authorities and US stakeholders becoming more prominent 
participants, as well as the TTIP institutions or the industry submitting 
‘joint submissions’. The old and new actors will create potentially 
powerful institutional dynamics.81
While stakeholders gain important new roles and functions, 
including agenda-setting and consultative roles, the question that we 
need to ask is whether the TTIP (in all its domestic interactions) will 
come with sufficiently symmetrical possibilities for access to various 
groups and individuals.82 This is of fundamental importance for the 
shape of the transatlantic market.
Research on the domestic context shows that actors who are 
better resourced are more ‘represented’ in the regulatory process.83 
The creation of new spaces for regulatory cooperation outside existing 
contexts, including new forms of information sharing and access, are 
likely to increase the need for resources and adjustment. It is highly 
probable that, at least in the short to medium term, asymmetries will 
increase due to the TTIP. While such asymmetries may be difficult to 
avoid, the TTIP does not envisage measures aimed at counter-acting 
their force.84
To the contrary, regulatory cooperation per the TTIP caters more 
to the needs of business stakeholders. Information sharing, both within 
the ‘list of planned acts’ and the Joint Annual Regulatory Programme, 
Participatory Democracy: EU-Governance and Civil Society (OUP 2013); Maria Green Cowles, 
‘The Transatlantic Business Dialogue and Domestic Business-Government Relations’ in 
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Cornell UP 2001) 159.
79 Wagner, ibid.
80 Daniel Carpenter and David A Moss, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest 
Influence and How to Limit It (CUP 2013).
81 See also Mendes, ‘Regulatory’ (n 2); Mendes, ‘Participation’ (n 2).
82 ibid.
83 See above (n 78).
84 The first step would be to recognize possible biases, and account for this possibility 
in the evaluation of participatory input. More pro-active measures could involve designing 
special mechanisms of contestation and/or alleviating the costs of participation.
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will identify ‘barriers’ to transatlantic trade and investment – a language 
more easily mobilized by business stakeholders. Furthermore, regulatory 
exchange itself will only start once one of the party is ‘summoned’ to 
discuss measures that will (more often than not) go beyond the level of 
protection that is present in the regulatory framework of the counter-
party and is likely, as such, to create a barrier.
Equally, the dominance of trade officials and regulatory affairs 
officials in TTIP institutions (Joint Committee and Transatlantic 
Regulators’ Forum) is likely to reinforce ideological opposition to ‘red 
tape’ and ‘barriers to trade’.85 This again may be more advantageous to 
business stakeholders, whose interests will often be aligned with the 
concerns that motivate the elimination of such barriers/red tape.
Finally, and rather paradoxically, de-regulatory pressures arise 
additionally because of the limited legal effects attributed to regulatory 
cooperation exchange.86 Given that the TTIP institutions will have no 
formal legal power (except for the ISDS), the members of these bodies 
are likely to favour those recommendations that may be implemented 
without requiring many formalities, without the involvement of 
legislators, and that can be easily monitored. Thus, it is likely that these 
institutions will tend to decide that certain regulations should not be 
adopted rather than taking positive action. This can take place through 
the favouring of certain forms of cost-benefit analyses (see section 3.3.2 
below) or particular uses of science (e.g. standards of proof).87
While the stakeholders’ role is to turn the TTIP into a ‘living 
agreement’, the TTIP puts in place a set of incentives that will be more 
easily mobilized by those actors who already have dominant access to the 
regulatory process – better resourced industry and business – increasingly 
their existing advantages. If we were to see such skewed ‘stakeholder 
basis’ of the TTIP agreement, it would give rise to both democratically 
and economically (epistemically) questionable regulation.88
3.3.2  Regulatory impact assessments
Since the TTIP institutions will enjoy only ‘softer’ power, with little formal 
bindingness, the alignment of regulatory practices has been at the core 
85 See for instance the speech of Cecilia Malstrom in Amsterdam, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=a4cgJFy_-d0, after 44th minute.
86 This argument will sound familiar to European scholars. The lack of political capacity 
at the side of the EU political institutions has made the ‘negative integration’ a main driver 
of the EU project, with ensuing problems and asymmetries. See more recently Scharpf 
(n 13).
87 Bartl (n 14).
88 For the elaboration of the theoretical dimension of this argument see Bartl (n 15).
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of the project. To paraphrase Alberto Alemanno, the convergence 
should not come from ‘what we do’ but from ‘how we do things’.89 
The regulatory impact assessments are central to this enterprise.
The TTIP is the first international treaty to oblige parties to 
‘maintain’ (Article 3) and ‘affirm their intention to carry out’ (Article 8) 
impact assessments.90 Beside the legal obligation to carry out the 
impact assessment, the chapter goes beyond current practices in the EU 
by requiring that impact assessments:
a. relate to relevant internationally agreed regulatory documents;
b.  take account of the regulatory approaches of the other Party, 
when the other Party has adopted or is planning to adopt 
regulatory acts on the same matter;
c. have an impact on international trade or investment.
Furthermore:
The Parties shall promote the exchange of information on available 
relevant evidence and data, on their practices in assessing 
impacts on international trade or investment, as well as on the 
methodology and economic assumptions applied in regulatory 
policy analysis.
The provisions on aligning instruments – or ‘regulatory analytics’ – have 
accompanied the transatlantic cooperation from its earlier stages. Already 
in 2007 the Charter of the Transatlantic Economic Cooperation Council, 
signed by Angela Merkel, Jose Manuel Barroso and George Bush, gave 
a prominent place to ‘pursu[ing] development of a methodological 
framework to help ensure the comparability of impact assessments, 
particularly risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis’.91
89 Wiener and Alemanno (n 2).
90 In contrast, the protocols to the WTO agreements oblige state parties to base decisions 
on science and evidence; the specific form is not articulated in the Treaty.
91 The whole commitment taken up in the Annex I, A of the Agreement on the 
Transatlantic Economic Council is worth reproducing in its entirety. It goes as follows:
 Fostering Cooperation and Reducing Regulatory Burdens
  Take the following steps to reduce barriers to transatlantic economic integration posed 
by new regulations by reinforcing the existing transatlantic dialogue structures:
  1.  Pursue development of a methodological framework to help ensure the 
comparability of impact assessments, particularly risk assessment and cost-
benefit analysis;
  2.  Appoint heads of regulatory authorities as permanent members of the EU–US 
High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum to report on any risks or benefits 
from significant differences in regulatory approaches identified in the sectoral
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Regulatory impact assessment is an instrument that aims to make 
more explicit and rationalize the reasoning behind various laws and 
regulations. It demands regulators evaluate various policy alternatives 
and compare them – in particular, by reference to the costs and benefits 
of these alternatives.
Beyond these surface similarities, the two jurisdictions have 
differed considerably in their appreciation of the purpose and form that 
this tool should take. The Reagan-era RIAs emerged in an ideological 
climate of distrust toward state and regulation, in a world where all 
manner of regulatory capture occurred and where regulation was seen 
to cause more harm than benefits. The purpose of RIAs in such a climate 
was to constrain regulatory power and reserve regulatory action only to 
cases where ‘welfare’ benefits clearly exceeded costs.92
Europe developed RIA much later, ‘centralizing’ the RIAs only 
in 2002. In a state- and regulation-friendlier Europe, the purpose of 
RIA has been to aid the development of policies and regulations by 
providing useful information. On this view, RIA should identify the 
main options for achieving regulatory objectives and compare their 
economic, environmental or social impacts.93
Given their different ideological underpinnings, including the 
attitude toward the state’s capacity to govern, the methods for evaluating 
the costs and benefits of regulation have diverged significantly across 
the Atlantic. Even if this gap has narrowed in recent years, thanks to the 
  3.  dialogues or the European Commission Secretariat General (EC)–US Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) dialogue called for under the 2005 EU–US 
Economic Initiative, recognizing that the Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue 
will continue its own, separate, work program described in Annex 6, and 
updating the Council on its progress as appropriate.
  3.  Reinforce the existing transatlantic dialogue on regulatory cooperation by 
cooperating to improve regulation, specifically through cooperation between 
OMB and the EC to:
  a)  Take into account, among other things, the impact assessment considerations 
in place, evaluate progress regarding this cooperation, and consider a more 
formal basis to enhance this cooperation;
  b)  Intensify their dialogue focusing on issues of methodology;
  c)  Hold regular and active exchanges on the overall framework of our regulatory 
cooperation and on methodological issues which may arise in individual 
cases;
  d)  Review the application of their respective regulatory impact analysis 
guidelines so that the regulatory impacts on trade and investment are 
considered, as appropriate; and
  e)  Share forward planning schedules.
92 Fernanda G Nicola, ‘Genealogies of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Transatlantic Regulatory 
Cooperation’ (2017) 15 Comp Eur Pol (special issue edited by Mark Bevir and Ryan Phillips 
on genealogies of European governance).
93 Andrea Renda, Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Regulation, Study for the European 
Commission (Center for European Policy Research, Brussels 2013).
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‘better regulation agenda’ of the European Commission (see section 4 
below), there still remain significant differences – primarily when it 
comes to the method for evaluating costs and benefits.
The main difference between two trading partners lies in the 
way their respective regulatory systems render comparable, and 
commensurable, various regulatory alternatives put forth in RIAs. In 
the US, the main method for rendering various options commensu-
rable has been through reliance on a neoclassical, welfare economics 
approach to cost-benefit analysis (CBA), enforced by OIRA.94 Elevated 
from its micro-economic context where it has been used to measure 
the costs and benefits in the context of firms or public projects 
(such as dams), US CBA tries to compare the costs and benefits of 
regulation in terms of their market value: how much firms will have 
to spend in order to comply with the regulation in comparison with 
people’s willingness to pay for benefits (such as clean air or health). 
In its most standard version, costs are established on the basis of 
an inquiry into the relevant industry regarding how much they 
estimate they would have to spend in order to comply with proposed 
regulations. The benefits are then evaluated on the basis of rather 
costly surveys (usually in shopping malls) which ask ‘people’ how 
much they would be willing to pay for, e.g. five extra years of life, or 
cleaner air.
The main advocates of the US’s CBA praise the rationality of 
decision-making based on this method, given its capacity to clearly 
quantify costs and benefits in terms of their market value and welfare-
enhancing faculties. More recently, for instance, Cass Sunstein has 
argued this method is ‘the best we have’ and agencies should not be so 
easily excused from its use.95 The critiques of welfare economics CBA, 
by contrast, suggest that this kind of CBA ascribes ultimately rather 
speculative values to costs and benefits of regulation,96 that it discounts 
the future benefits for present costs, contributing thereby to inter-
generational injustice, or that it often fails to account for less tangible 
benefits.97
94 The new Better Regulation guidelines establish an organ with similar competencies in 
the EU: the so-called Regulatory Scrutiny Board. See Bartl (n 14).
95 Most recently see for instance Cass R Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness 
Review, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No 16-12.
96 Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless (n 32); Ackerman and Heinzerling, ‘Pricing the 
Priceless’ (n 32); Kennedy, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems’ (n 32).
97 ibid. An additional important feature that distinguishes the US from the EU system 
is the possibility to enforce ‘better regulation’ in courts. Since the US courts have been 
eager to enforce a strict standard of review as it concerns scientific evidence, that needs to 
be provided by the regulator if she is to regulate, as well as level of engagement with the
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The valuation of costs and benefits in the EU, by contrast, is 
far more pluralistic than in the US – including both quantitative and 
qualitative methods, and among quantitative methods includes several 
variants: welfare economics CBA, social CBA, and most importantly 
multiple criteria analysis.98 It is understood that this plurality of 
methods allows for a more accurate valuation of costs and benefits in 
the face of ‘values’ that are often difficult to quantify.99 This concern 
with a plurality of methods, and their close relation to underlying 
normative commitments, has been affirmed in the latest May 2015 
package.100
Eventual convergence toward the US single-form CBA, including 
its economic assumptions, imply a radical political choice for the EU, 
with significant normative consequences that would touch on the 
broadest range of regulatory issues. The assumptions behind (US) CBA 
are patently normative: (a) it assumes that all sorts of values can be 
expressed as individualized market preferences on a monetary scale, 
(b) that the best policy is the one that is the most efficient – the one that 
produces most benefits in comparison with its costs, and, finally, (c) the 
efficiency principle remains insensitive to its distributional effects – who 
incurs benefits and who incurs costs (Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).101
Expanding the scope of US CBA would force the EU regulator 
to make several normative choices – before even starting its quantifi-
cation. First, it forces the regulator to take the market as the correct 
frame of reference for thinking about social justice, the environment or 
public health. Second, given that welfare economics CBA is indifferent 
to distributive effects of regulation and understands costs to business 
as costs to society, the question who bears the costs and who reaps 
the benefits of the (missing) regulation is hidden from its purview. 
By embracing CBA, the EU would neglect the responsibility for the 
future impacts of our behaviour. The metric of market and individu-
alized preferences depends on ‘discounting future benefits’, valuing 
stakeholders (Information capture – Wagner), the court involvement has caused significant 
regulatory chill. Sometimes it is enough if the industry threatens with going to the court 
and the regulators will water down the proposal. This has been very different in the EU, 
where the courts both endorsed precautionary principle (EU treaties, case law) as well as 
large deference to administration. To this effect see Wagner (n 78); David Vogel, The Politics 
of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in Europe and the United 
States (Princeton UP 2015).
 98 Renda (n 93).
 99 ibid.
100 One should not discount, however, the nudging effects of the fact that the last better 
regulation package gives considerably more space and attention to welfare economics cost-
benefit analysis.
101 Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless (n 32).
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more current costs (to business) than future benefits (to society).102 
Now, while such normative assumptions may be appropriate in certain 
contexts, they are largely inappropriate for the majority of regulatory 
measures that cater to values other than efficiency.
I have thus far only described the main differences between 
valuing costs and benefits in two regulatory systems. The critical 
question, however, is whether and how the TTIP’s institutions might 
tip the balance toward one of these methods. Whatever shift we may 
expect, it will proceed incrementally and, at some level, multidirection-
ally: TTIP regulatory cooperation surely does not present a one-way 
street from the EU pluralistic model to the US orthodox model of 
evaluating costs and benefits. In fact, in reaction to criticism, the last 
versions of the Commission’s position papers mention that impact 
assessment should not rely only on quantitative cost-benefit analysis, 
and that the regulatory cooperation should not prevent member states 
from maintaining their approaches to risk analysis and management.
Yet, despite this laudable commitment, there are several insti-
tutional reasons that will facilitate the shift toward more orthodox 
US-style evaluation of costs and benefits in the EU rather than the other 
way around. First of all, the TTIP empowers those actors – in bilateral 
exchanges, sectoral committees, the Transatlantic Regulators’ Forum or 
Joint Committee, but also in domestic regulatory processes (stakeholder 
participation and good regulatory practices) – who are likely to prefer 
US-style CBA.
Most obviously, the involvement of US authorities, who already 
rely on welfare economics CBA and who, additionally, are expected to 
use the exchange in order to eliminate barriers to trade (which is, in 
principle, in the common interest of both businesses and consumers) will 
add some weight to this form of CBA. The involvement of the US officials 
is certainly not enough. In fact, we could speculate that the transfer 
could easily also go the other way around. Yet, more importantly, 
the TTIP (asymmetrically) empowers more resourceful stakeholders 
from both the EU and US side, thus garnering vocal supporters of the 
regulation un-friendly welfare economics CBA. Finally, perhaps the most 
important factor is that the TTIP makes trade officials and regulatory 
affairs officials the core members in the TTIP institutions, empowering 
thus those actors in the EU who already favour (Secretariat General of 
the Commission103) or are more likely to favour (trade officials, thanks 
102 ibid.
103 Andrea Renda et al, Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Regulation (Brussels 2013) 
http://www.economistiassociati.com/files/cba_study_sg_final_0.pdf.
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to their concern with eliminating problematic barriers to trade) the shift 
toward a streamlined, US-like CBA. These institutional reasons offer 
sufficient ground for a conclusion that the TTIP sets a ground for tilting 
the EU toward the US-like CBA – rather than the other way around.
4. The interaction of better regulation and the TTIP 
regulatory cooperation
While a previous institutional analysis suggests that the TTIP’s regulatory 
cooperation prepares grounds for the shift of the EU toward the US-like 
regulatory style, in this section I add an additional political reason that 
grounds this suspicion. I do so by placing the TTIP discussion within the 
context of the EU domestic political clash.
Relatively recent Greenpeace leaks have revealed that the US has 
pushed for (infamous) ‘notice and comment’ procedures in the TTIP, 
the US-like CBA as well as the requirement of so-called ‘sound science’. 
However, this push is certainly not coming only from without. In fact, 
comparing the leaked documents and the February papers reveals that 
EU concessions to the US could have been given with a ‘light heart’ 
since many of them have been first implemented within the EU Better 
Regulation guidelines, as a part of the political programme of the 
Secretariat General of the European Commission. It is only within the 
TTIP however that they are given the force of (international) law.
The so-called ‘better regulation’ agenda in Europe has its own 
history. While in the Thatcher and Reagan era significant opposition 
to regulation developed in the US and the UK, it was not until the first 
Barroso Commission that the European Union began to treat regulation 
as a problem to be solved. So-called ‘smart regulation’, ‘better regulation’, 
‘evidence based decision-making’ or ‘regulatory fitness’ gradually came 
to place emphasis on regulatory impact assessments, including cost-
benefit evaluations, broad consultations of stakeholders, transparency, 
review of regulations etc. The purpose of these instruments was to 
regulate more rationally and efficiently, imposing less cost – or ‘red 
tape’ – on businesses.104
Some have recognized that this shift (perhaps unfairly discounting 
British influence) is a swing toward American regulatory culture.105 In 
104 See the European Commission’s webpage ‘Better Regulation: Why and How’ http://
ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/better-regulation-why-and-how_en.
105 Vogel (n 97).
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more than a decade, the definition of ‘red tape’ in the EU has expanded. 
Some allege that previous concern regarding ‘administrative’ burdens 
(reflected in the term ‘red tape’) has over time become a ‘green tape’ 
or an initiative to cut regulatory burden on businesses in general.106 
The search for ‘methodological alignment’ within the context of 
Transatlantic Economic Integration in the mid-2000s, where Chancellor 
Merkel, President Barroso and President Bush placed methodological 
alignment at the heart of the Transatlantic Economic Council, can be 
seen as a part of this shift.107
The emphasis on cutting red tape through better regulation 
was reinforced with the first ‘truly’ political Commission headed by 
Mr Juncker, who has made cutting ‘red tape’ a central theme of his 
presidency. In May 2015, the Commission published a new, better 
regulation package,108 introducing important changes that bring the 
EU, directly or indirectly, closer to the US mode of regulation. The most 
important changes are:
1.  Two stage-impact assessment and stakeholder consultation. 
Regulatory initiatives will be subject (depending on the importance 
of the intended regulation) to a two-stage impact assessment and 
a two-stage consultation procedure: inception impact assessment 
should be accompanied by initial consultations to determine the 
proper framing of the problem and methodologies to address it. If 
the regulatory idea surmounts this hurdle, a full impact assessment 
should be developed, accompanied by a second (public) consul-
tation. In this way, similarly to the US procedure, stakeholders 
get access at a much earlier stage to the framing of the ideas and 
priorities of regulation. They have, as well, a say as to the method-
ologies for evaluating costs and benefits.
2.  Regulatory Scrutiny Board. The new guidelines also introduce a 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), which is to replace the Impact 
Assessment body. The difference between its old and new incarnation 
106 Pieter de Pous, Better Regulation under the Radar (Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung 
2016) http://www.eeb.org/index.cfm/library/better-regulation-ttip-under-the-radar/.
107 See the document establishing the Transatlantic Economic Council http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/may/tradoc_134654.pdf.
108 Better Regulation guidelines can be accessed here: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/guidelines/toc_guide_en.htm. These efforts have also had strong political 
support from the recent European Parliament, and recently also received the endorsement 
of the next three Council Presidencies (Netherlands, Slovakia and Malta). For an excellent 
discussion of the Better Regulation guidelines see Mark Dawson, ‘Better Regulation and the 
Future of EU Regulatory Law and Politics’ 53(5) (2016) CM L Rev 1209.
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is that the new body, which is not far from the US OIRA, becomes a 
permanent organ with a right to veto all Commission’s proposals that 
are not in line with better regulation standards. The RSB has already 
shown its teeth, rejecting more RIAs than its predecessor.109
3.  Cost-benefit analysis. The new guidelines set rules on how to conduct 
cost-benefit analyses. While at several points the Commission admits 
that certain values are difficult to quantify, for instance those related 
to fairness, redistribution or valuation of human life, the guidelines 
at the same time provide very specific instructions regarding 
how to monetize those otherwise unquantifiable concerns (life, 
environment, etc.).110 In the 2015 report, the Commission, seemingly 
pleased, notes that the number of impact assessments, where the 
quantitative analysis has been performed, has increased.111
4.  Surveying regulatory fitness. Regulation ‘fitness’ will not only be 
tested a priori but also a posteriori. The testing will be undertaken 
by the RSB, as a matter of standard regulatory practice, or upon the 
proposals of stakeholders. These proposals may be independent, or 
they may come from the so-called REFIT stakeholder group. The 
purpose of these ‘performance checks’ is to remove ineffective or 
burdensome regulatory measures.
The Commission’s proposal for regulatory cooperation, April 2015, 
preceded the EU’s latest Better Regulation guidelines by a month. The 
new 2016 position papers on regulatory cooperation differ considerably 
from the May 2015 position papers, taking on board much of the Better 
Regulation guidelines – which already correspond to many US demands, as 
can be inferred from the Greenpeace leaks on regulatory cooperation, which 
predate the March 2016 position papers of the European Commission.
The concessions that the Commission has been willing to make 
vis-à-vis the US crucially relate to the expansion of ‘good governance’ 
principles committed to in TTIP and the expansion of sectoral 
committees, while cutting down on other institutional provisions. 
109 See the report comparing the activities of the Impact Assessment Board and 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board in 2015 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/key_
docs/docs/iab_rsb_stats_2015.pdf.
110 For instance, the ‘quality-adjusted life year’ matrix is placed under the rubric of non-
monetary valuations, since they concern years saved instead of money saved. Yet the value 
of years is calculated in monetary terms. The usefulness of the regulation – its benefits – 
is given monetary value correlated to how many years of life the regulation will save: 
the younger the person saved, the more money will be saved, and the more efficient the 
regulation is. European Commission, ‘Better Regulation Guidelines’ 198ff http://ec.europa.
eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/br_toolbox_en.pdf (accessed 9 May 2016).
111 See above (n 106).
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First of all, in line with US demands, the proposal introduces an 
obligation of retrospective review of regulations.112 This obligation was 
not part of the previous Commission’s proposals, but it is already an 
important, if not foundational, element of Better Regulations (REFIT 
programme). Second, an important concession is the introduction of 
an internal coordination mechanism, at the insistence of the US. The 
emergence of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, a new body with large 
competences not dissimilar to the US OIRA, has greatly influenced this 
concession.113 Finally, broad possibilities for stakeholder participation 
and transparency, including a say for stakeholders in priority-setting, 
and their right to provide their view also on ‘retrospective evaluation’, 
was  unimaginable prior to the issuance of the Better Regulation 
guidelines last May.
All those commitments elevated from Better Regulation guidelines 
into the TTIP attain not only the status of international law but also 
a set of new stakeholders (US authorities or stakeholders) who can 
legitimately demand their fulfilment. This juridification of better 
regulation upwards, to the TTIP, is ultimately intended to facilitate 
the de- regulatory efforts of the current European Commission, often 
presented as a quest for ‘regulatory fitness’ or cutting ‘red tape’.
Beyond the substantive similarities between the EU Better 
Regulation and TTIP’s regulatory cooperation proposals, we could have 
also expected the interaction between these two sets of rules and institu-
tions. In fact, the Better Regulation–TTIP compendium would reinforce 
each other, creating an enhanced set of hurdles for the prevention of 
‘inefficient’ or ‘burdensome’ regulations.
To illustrate, any potential EU regulatory measure must pass a 
multi-stage process in which many actors have their say. First, in the 
initial stage of the impact assessment introduced by the latest Better 
Regulation guidelines, stakeholders introduce their initial objections, 
as to the framing of the problem and the methodologies chosen for 
evaluating risks or costs of regulation. If the regulatory idea survives 
112 European Commission (n 76):
 Article 9 – Retrospective Evaluation
  1.  Each Party shall maintain procedures or mechanisms to promote periodic 
retrospective evaluations of regulatory frameworks.
  2.  The Parties shall promote the exchange of experience and share information on 
planned retrospective evaluations.
113 European Commission (n 76):
 Article 3 – Internal coordination
   Each Party shall maintain internal coordination processes or mechanisms in order 
to foster good regulatory practices, including transparent planning, stakeholder 
consultation, impact assessments and retrospective evaluations of regulatory acts.
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this consultation, the next phase involves a full impact assessment and 
a second (public) consultation.
The impact assessment is required to comply with the Better 
Regulation guidelines, which in principle allow for various kinds of 
analyses of costs and benefits but ultimately prefer quantitative analysis 
and, most specifically, welfare economics CBA, to which a preponderant 
amount of space is devoted in the Better Regulation guidelines. The 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board scrutinizes whether the impact assessment 
has been performed adequately, and the Board has the right to veto 
proposals that do not meet its standards of evidence.
Once the TTIP institutions (or eventually sectoral agreements) are 
in place, the same regulation would be included in ‘the list of preparatory 
acts’, where each state party must compile all those regulations that are 
likely to pose a barrier to trade (the majority of regulations, if divergent, 
constitute such barriers). This list will assist the counter-party and its 
stakeholders to identify which proposals are impediments to market 
access or their other interests. If such impediments are identified, the 
US may then request the engagement of bilateral exchange, or refer the 
issue to the Transatlantic Regulators’ Forum or a sectoral committee. 
Special concern is afforded to joint submissions by stakeholders from 
both sides of the Atlantic.
Whichever TTIP body treats the issue, it will be an institutional 
context in which the proposal has to be explained and justified. 
Let us recall some of the main institutional characteristics of the 
TTIP bodies. They will be composed mainly of trade officials and 
regulatory affairs officials, the majority of whom will view the world 
as being composed of barriers and red tape impeding efficient market 
functioning. From the European side, we refer to DG trade officials 
and members of the Secretarial General of the European Commission, 
responsible for the coordination of regulatory activities; from the US 
side, delegates of the US Trade Representative and OIRA. The officials 
of other DGs, or US agencies, will be a minority both in numbers and 
likely also in terms of their normative influence in these institutions. It 
is submitted, thus, that in such a constellation we may expect the TTIP 
framework to become a vehicle to pressure for the quantification of 
measures through the more ‘solid’ US-like welfare economics CBA.
Finally, an interesting dynamic emerges between the TTIP 
mechanism and the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. If a particular DG 
has been advised by the TTIP bodies that either its ‘numbers’ are not 
right, or sufficiently robust, or its science is not ‘sound’, the Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board may veto such proposals. The TTIP advice will anyhow 
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correspond to the tools envisaged, or even prioritized, by the Better 
Regulation guidelines.
5. Conclusion
The TTIP institutional framework of regulatory cooperation has often 
been presented as an innocuous space for regulatory learning and 
exchange. Yet institutions rarely ever present an institutionally ‘neutral’ 
stage, free of politics. Rather, institutions in general, and the TTIP’s 
institutions in particular, will both constrain some types of exchange 
while enabling others, and allow for some kinds of learning while 
impeding others.
This article has aimed to offer a framework for the analysis of 
institution-making beyond the state. Incorporating insights from law 
and political science, I have suggested that any such analysis needs 
to focus on three levels of inquiry: (a) the normative overflow of the 
objectives of functional integration, (b) the structure and composition 
of emergent institutions, primarily from the perspective of the kinds 
of knowledge and expertise that are likely to prevail and, finally, 
(c) the study of the instruments of governance, such as regulatory 
impact assessments and cost-benefit analysis. This level of inquiry also 
asks which empowered stakeholders are supposed to bring the ‘new’ 
institution/market into life. 
With this lens, I have proceeded to analyse TTIP’s regulatory 
cooperation, which is often presented by proponents as a mere space 
for learning and exchange, or discounted by lawyers for its inability 
to produce legally binding decisions. I have suggested that the type 
of regulatory cooperation envisaged by the TTIP could have far more 
impact than often acknowledged. It could change the institutional 
landscape in both the EU and the US, re-positioning various participants 
in the political struggle over market regulation, creating asymmetries 
as to who has access to these new institutional spaces and what kind 
of issues will be raised and discussed and, finally, limiting the array of 
available solutions to common problems.
While the proposed analytical framework may find broad applica-
bility in the study of transnational institutions, I acknowledge that the 
specific evaluation of the institutional dynamics in each particular case 
ultimately requires the appreciation of political and economic facts that 
evade any linear methodological framing. The possibility of different 
interpretations should not, however, discourage scholars from engaging 
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in such evaluative/predictive exercises. It is of crucial importance that 
legal scholars with diverse sensitivities (administrative lawyers, interna-
tional lawyers, trade lawyers, EU lawyers and so forth) engage with the 
institutions whose importance transcends any of those particular fields 
and which, sooner or later, may govern our lives in perhaps subtle but 
profound ways.
